He will not admit that there is any evidence of true virtue in the approbation of virtue and hatred of vice, in the workings of conscience or in the exercises of the natural affections; he thinks that these may all spring from self-love and the association of ideas, from " instinct " or from a " moral sense of a secondary kind " entirely different from " a sense or relish of the essential beauty of true virtue."
The identification is slightly qualified in Hutcheson's posthumously published System of Moral Philosophy (1755), in which the general view of Shaftesbury is more fully developed, with several new psychological distinctions, including Butler's, separation of " calm " benevolence - as well as, after Butler, " calm self-love " - from the " turbulent " passions, selfish or social.
Some years earlier, Gay,' admitting Hutcheson's proof of the actual disinterestedness of moral and benevolent impulses, had maintained that these (like the desires of knowledge or fame, the delight of reading, hunting and planting, &c.) were derived from self-love by " the power of association."
We have, in fact, to distinguish self-love, the " general desire that every man hath of his own happiness " or pleasure, from the particular affections, passions, and appetites directed towards objects other than pleasure, in the satisfaction of which pleasure consists.
Reid considers " regard for one's good on the whole " (Butler's self-love) and " sense of duty " (Butler's conscience) as two essentially distinct and co-ordinate rational principles, though naturally often comprehended under the one term, Reason.