Thus his metaphysics is Leibnitzian, like that of Lotze, and yet is opposed to the most characteristic feature of monadology - the percipient indivisible monad.
" Each of us is a self," he says, and in another passage, " The real self is one and indivisible, and is unique in each individual.
The parts in the one case, the general name or common attributes in the other, are only, he seems to have argued, so many subjective points of view from which we choose to regard that which in its own essence is one and indivisible, existing in its own right apart from any connexion with other individuals.
Herbart and Lotze, both deeply affected by the Leibnitzian hypothesis of indivisible monads, supposed that man's soul is seated at a central point in the brain; and Lotze supposed that this supposition is necessary to explain the unity of consciousness.
" By this act," it was laid down, " the new State appears and stands from to-day as an indivisible state-unit and as a member of the Society of Free Nations.